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INTRODUCTION
Now-a-days, surveillance cameras have been widely used in public places, work places and homes in connection with detection and quick resolution of crimes, traffic accidents/violations and other incidents. In this type of applications, the images are captured over long periods of time and thus the volume of data generated is enormous. Hence transmission of such videos over bandwidth limited networks and its storage can be a bottleneck in many applications. Object based video segmentation mechanisms can be used to segment a video frame into background and fore- * Thanks to the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore for supporting this work under the project 'Digital Rights Violation Detection for Digital Asset Management' (Project No: 0721010022). ground objects [3, 12, 14, 18] . In many surveillance applications, the background changes very slowly, and the ratio of the frame size to the total area occupied by objects in the frame is small. In these types of videos, object segmentation gives an efficient solution for transmission of the video over bandwidth limited networks by sending only the foreground objects frame by frame in real time and the background once over a relatively long time interval.
However, sending a video as background and objects pose new challenges to the security of the video, since the video objects and background can be easily accessed, modified, or replaced by another object or background. Hence there is a need for a secure mechanism for protecting the authenticity of videos transmitted as objects and background as the video could be used as legal testimony in a court later.
In this paper, we propose a Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) [6] based authentication mechanism which can be used for surveillance video transmission with background subtraction. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed in the literature yet. The proposed mechanism carries over to the case of efficient storage in a straightforward manner. We establish the authenticity of each frame by embedding a unique joint watermark on each foreground object that is transmitted. Watermark information are computed for each object present in the frame as well as the corresponding background which was filtered out. Then a joint watermark information is computed from them using CRT. Finally a watermark is generated from this joint watermark information and is embedded on each of the object that is transmitted. We use CRT as it has an intrinsic lock property [4] and thus all the foreground objects and background information can be locked as a single watermark. The receiver can unlock the watermark and get information about the objects and the background. The joint watermark can be used to establish the existence of objects in a frame and their association with the background. Thus, our authentication mechanism ensures that the video file has not been falsely manipulated and the foreground objects can be proved to be part of the original video content. The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion on video segmentation and estimates of possible bandwidth savings by transmitting only the foreground objects instead of complete frames are given in Section 2. The proposed authentication mechanism is described in detail in Section 3 and Section 4. The security analysis is carried out in Section 5. Finally, the paper concludes with some observations and future directions in Section 6.
Video Segmentation and Analysis
Any frame of a video is a collection of a background and a set of foreground objects. Video segmentation is a process of extraction of the background and the foreground objects from a frame. There exist many algorithms which can efficiently extract out the individual foreground objects from the background in a video frame. These algorithms can be classified into three categories: image segmentation based, motion based and change-detection based [9] . Image segmentation based algorithms first segment a frame into homogeneous regions by spatial similarity and then merge these areas by other criteria [14] . Motion based algorithms treat object as areas with coherent motion and find regions with coherent motion by grouping dense motion vector [18] . Change-detection based algorithms find difference areas temporally that are sensitive to human eyes [3, 19] .
In many surveillance video applications, the background remains static or changes slowly or changes with a fixed pattern known a priori. These characteristics of the surveillance videos have been used to simplify, reduce the computational complexity and improve the accuracy of segmentation algorithms [19] . Many of these algorithms use background subtraction technique for video segmentation. In a changing background scenario, a background subtraction method based on adaptive modeling of the background using a proper learning algorithm is used. This method updates the current background according to the real-time change [11] . We now estimate the possible bandwidth saving by transmitting only the foreground objects instead of complete frames. We performed segmentation on two test surveillance videos using the segmentation algorithm given in [12] . The first experiment was performed on the video 'Shopping Center in Portugal' [24] given in Fig. 1 . The second experiment was performed on the video 'AVSS PV Medium' [25] given in Fig. 3 . The segmentation was performed on 50 consecutive frames of the videos. The ratio of the size of the foreground objects to the total frame size is computed for each frame and are given Fig. 2 and Fig.  4 . The x-axis denotes the frame number and the y-axis denotes this ratio. Fig. 2 from the first experiment (one object) shows that the foreground object occupies only around 1% of a frame and thus the bandwidth saving in this case could be close to 99%. Fig. 4 from the second experiment (multi-ple objects) shows that the foreground objects occupy only around 4.5% of a frame and thus the bandwidth saving in this case could be close to 95.5%. 
Proposed Framework at the Sender
In this section, we describe the proposed framework at the sender's side. The sender can be identified with the camera. The framework is illustrated in Fig 5. The details are as follows.
Assumptions, Initial Setup and Segmentation
We assume that V is a surveillance video such that the background is static or changes very slowly, and the ratio of the total number of pixels occupied by the foreground objects to the total number of pixels in the frame is small. In other words the foreground objects occupy only a relatively small portion of each frame of the video V .
Since the background is either static or changes very slowly, it is updated only at the end of large intervals. So without loss of generality we can assume that the background B is fixed. The background B is initially transmitted without any foreground objects present in it as shown in The sender and receiver agree on two secret cryptographic keys K mac and K rnd . K mac is used to generate watermark information of the foreground objects and the background from their features using a cryptographic MAC function M AC(, ) [22] . K rnd is used to generate a secure pseudo-random number sequence using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator P RNG(, ) [23] . Further, the sender and receiver agree on a set of coprime integers N 0 , N B , N 1 , N 2 , . . . .
The i-th frame V i of the video is segmented using a segmentation algorithm with background subtraction and n i foreground objects O 
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
Let n 1 , . . . , n k be pairwise coprime positive integers and r 1 , . . . , r k be any collection of integers. Then the k congruences
CRT has been used in many security related applications. Some such applications are digital watermarking protocols for the multiparty multilevel DRM architectures [20, 21] , watermarking schemes for image authentication [16, 17] , a secure broadcast communication scheme [4] , a robust t-outof-n oblivious transfer protocol [2] and a key distribution scheme for conditional access system in digital TV broadcast [10] .
Feature Extraction and Watermark Information Generation
Features are extracted from each foreground object O 
The watermark information W B of the background B is computed as
where P val B is the concatenation of the random pixel values of B computed as in the case of the object O j i . 
Joint Watermark Generation and Embedding
The existence and uniqueness of W i is guaranteed by CRT.
For the simplicity of the discussion, we confine to watermarking in the spatial domain using the spread spectrum watermarking algorithm of Hartung and Girod [8] . The proposed method can be easily modified for watermarking in the transform domain with other watermarking mechanisms. The watermarking on the object O j i is carried out as follows.
Let W i be expressed in the binary form as W i = w Now the discrete signal {a j } j>0 is spread by the chip-rate cr to obtain the spread sequence
The spread sequence b k is amplified with locally adjustable amplitude factor α k ≥ 0 and is then modulated by a binary pseudo-noise sequence
Now the spread spectrum watermark is obtained as
wm i is then embedded into the object O j i using the equations, 
Protocol at the Sender's Side
The protocol at the camera is as follows. Initially the background B without any foreground object is captured. The watermark information of the background W B is generated as in the case of the foreground objects described in Section 3.3. There is no joint watermark generation in this case. The watermark signal is generated from W B and then embedded into B in a similar manner as in the case of object O j i described in Section 3.4. The watermarked background B is then transmitted after encoding. The foreground objects in each frame are then transmitted in real time as follows. We describe the protocol for the i-th frame V i of the video, where i ∈ N.
1. V i is segmented as described in Section 3.1 and n i foreground objects O are encoded and assembled as a frame V i and is transmitted.
Efficiency of Transmission
The major computations involved at the sender's side are computations of M AC(, ) in Section 3.3. The M AC(, ) for each object can be computed in parallel. MAC is used in IPSec and SSL protocols and there are now very efficient hardware implementations of MAC/HAMC functions with throughput of atleast 1600 Mbps [15] . The other operations are computation of one CRT and watermark generation and embedding using Hartung's spread spectrum algorithm. CRT can be computed very efficiently [20] . Hartung's watermarking algorithm is efficient and can be used in real-time video transmission. Thus, we do not expect any substantial slow down in real-time video transmission due to the proposed authentication mechanism.
The transmission can be made more efficient by watermarking only a selected set of frames of the video. 
Proposed Framework at the Receiver
The framework of the system at the receiver's side is given in Fig 8. We describe the steps performed by the receiver for the i-th frame V i of the video. The receiver first extracts out the watermarked objects O 
Watermark and Watermark Information Extraction
The watermark is retrieved as described in [8] and the embedded information bits {a j } j>0 are obtained. The joint watermark information W i is then computed from {a j } j>0 using Equation 4 .
The number of objects n i , watermark information of the background W B and watermark information of the objects O j i are computed using the same set of congruences, 1 to 3 given in Section 3.4.
Authenticity Verification
The receiver first verifies that the number of objects in the received frame is equal to n i computed from Eqn. 1. It then computes the object watermark information from the watermarked object O j i using the same way as that by the sender given in Section 3.3. This is possible because the set of pixels from which watermark information are computed and the set of pixels on which the joint watermark is embedded are disjoint. The receiver checks whether this object watermark information computed from the pixels matches with W j i computed from Eqn 3. It also checks whether the watermark information of the background computed from the pixels matches with W B computed from Eqn. 2. These verifications are repeated for all the objects and if all the verifications are successful V i is accepted as authentic.
Protocol at the Receiver's Side
The protocol at the receiver's side is as follows. Initially the background B without any foreground object is received. The watermark signal W B is extracted from B in a similar manner as described in Section 4.1. The watermark information of the background is then generated from B as in the case of foreground objects described in Section 4.2. The receiver then compares the extracted watermark signal with the generated one. If they match, the background B is accepted as authentic and is stored. The foreground objects in each frame are received in real time and is processed as follows. We describe the protocol for the i-th frame V i of the video, where i ∈ N. 
Security Analysis
In this section, we carry out the security analysis of the proposed mechanism. A malicious entity can carry out one or more of the following three attacks (in the decreasing order of importance).
1. adding or removal or modification or replacement of some or all of the objects/background;
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel mechanism using CRT to check the authenticity of a surveillance video transmitted as foreground objects and backgrounds. The experiments in Section 2, demonstrated that in many surveillance video applications, one may be able to save considerable bandwidth by only transmitting the foreground objects in real time and the backgrounds once in a while. The proposed authentication mechanism takes care of the security concerns related to the manipulation of a video frame.
For the simplicity of the discussion, in this paper we built our authentication mechanism using the spatial spread spectrum watermarking algorithm of Hartung and Girod [8] in the uncompressed domain. We will carry out the extension of this work to the compressed domain with more rigorous robustness analysis and performance evaluations as future work.
